Abstract. Assuming the availability of an oracle for handling black box groups isomorphic to SL 2 , we present an algorithm that constructively recognises a group known to be isomorphic to PSL ! for known # " 3 and . We also outline an analogous result for symplectic groups.
Introduction
The presently known algorithms for constructive recognition of black box classical simple groups have asymptotic running times that are not polynomial [Br, KS] : the complexity contains factors of $ (the field size), whereas the input size involves only log $ . In this paper, we will take a step toward the polynomial time paradigm for the PSL%
case, removing all factors of $ in the timing at the expense of making calls to an oracle that allows us to work inside subgroups isomorphic to SL% 2( 0 $ 3 1 ; thus, SL% 2( 0 $ 3 1 is the polynomial-time bottleneck. Consequently, we pay close attention to the cost 4 of each call to our hypothesised SL% 2( 0 $ 3 1 -oracle, in addition to the more standard timing parameters used in [KS] (namely, the input length, which is greater than Note that failure in (1) could be due to bad luck with random selections, or to the fact that 8 is not isomorphic to the stated type of quotient group; but if there is an output then it is guaranteed to be correct (since the algorithm is Las Vegas). The lower bound on $ is designed to simplify our arguments; the algorithm of [KS] applies for the remaining small algorithm presented in [KS] . We frequently refer to results and routines contained therein with little further comment, and will generally adhere to notational conventions used there.
The case
& B
3 is the hardest one we consider (cf. Section 3). The general case, in Section 2, needs only a few non-obvious modifications of [KS] . We note that we use our SL% 2( 0 $ 3 1 -oracle for various subgroups isomorphic to SL% 2( 0 $ 3 1 , many of which involve somewhat random generators; it would have been far better to have used the oracle only a few times. However, it is hard to imagine not needing at least can be reduced to this case using a Monte Carlo algorithm for finding the derived group [BCFLS] .
In Section 4 we outline an analogue of this theorem for symplectic groups and comment on the other classical groups. We have continued to follow the recursive approach in [KS] . There is some hope that this can be avoided. In particular, we suspect that the methods used in [Br] , and a bijection
, behaving as in Theorem 1.1. We denote by 4 the time required for Theorem 1.1(1) as well as for each application of Theorem 1.1(2).
(ii) The oracle is also equipped with routines for discrete logarithms in GF% can be replaced by a specific power of itself to ensure that and induce the same scalar on y . The discrete log oracle tells us which power. We view this oracle as a black box. However, in practice it will presumably be replaced by a Las Vegas algorithm for Theorem 1.1(1): the algorithms in [KS] and [CLG] for this is are, indeed, Las Vegas. On the other hand, we assume that our discrete log oracle is deterministic in practice.
The general case: 4
Somewhat as in [KS] , the methods we employ for dimension 3 differ widely from the larger dimensions. In this section, we assume that
4, and whenever possible we follow closely the algorithm in [KS] . In particular, the algorithm we present here is recursive. We wish to ensure that the probability of the routine failing up to the point where the recursive call is made in Section 2.6 is no more than 1 2 . In any non-deterministic step in the main routine, this is achieved by making an extra factor of (at least) log & 3 random choices.
2.1. Background. We recall some background material discussed at greater length in [KS] .
(1) Groups of transvections. We assume a familiarity with the basic properties of transvections and transvection subgroups of SL% , although we will not use the additional time required to verify a presentation. With small probability, the subgroups generated by our chosen elements might not be SL% 3( ) and the failure goes undetected. However, in this case, the algorithm will eventually fail, and we will not succeed in our goal of finding and verifying a presentation for 
4.
The elements ; fix a generator
throughout the remainder of the proof (observe that this generator is available from just one call to the SL% 2(
. We prefer, for two reasons, to work with a subgroup SL% 3( . Use linear algebra to compute the 2-spaces
, and find Q SL% 6 Á 1 such that
times to find a generating set
, and an isomorphism
behaving as in Theorem 1.1. Use Theorem 1.1(2b)
to find the matrices
. The purpose of each of the
repetitions above is to ensure that we correctly find all of the matrices
and the isomorphism u Ø with probability
All of the remaining uses for u Ø will be to compute images of matrices in the group È , using the deterministic Theorem 1.1(2a), so there will be no more randomness needed in this section. 
Some elements and subgroups of
1 (i.e., 
, and it succeeds with probability at least 1 1 4 2 .
Constructing transvection groups and
® when«± 4. Next we also construct a naturally embedded subgroup -number, and setB time.
The subgroups
. We claim that, with probability 4 we proceed more simply, as well as deterministically, by defining 
is the image under u of the group of transvections with centre .
The subgroup
4 and ): 
3.
We note that the corresponding time in [KS] was
for a deterministic algorithm. However, we will always need to repeat the lemma at least 2 6 log & 3 times in order to ensure that it produces an output with probability £ 1 1 2 ; we will see this very soon below, as well as later in Section 2.8. We note also that the probability 1 2 6 can be increased considerably here, since we are generating with full transvection groups, and we are assuming that calls to Lemma 2.1 to find calls to Lemma 2.1.
2H . That

Recursion. Recursively we find an isomorphism
; however, as in Section 2.3 and 2.5 we do not include the verification part of the algorithm in this call, postponing verification until Section 2.8. If this recursive call fails then the algorithm terminates. Failure can occur for two very different reasons: a group , % ' r 1 or j constructed in Section 2.5 was not the desired group; or these groups were correct but the recursive call failed to give an output. The probability of any of these events is small, and hence we can ignore them: we have an isomorphism u . We may need to modify the isomorphism u in order to ensure that the stabiliser of a 1-space in the natural SL% times in order to ensure the stated probability, so that the algorithm takes . We follow the timing calculation in [KS], 7.2.2, keeping in mind that the probability of success of each Las Vegas routine must be large enough so that the probability that any routine fails is small: the total time is
, where
. (Note that we repeat the algorithm in Theorem 1.1(2b)
times for each element of F in order to make the probabilities behave correctly.)
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Throughout this section we assume that 3. In the context of this paper, we view the following algorithm as deterministic: the only use of randomness is that which is occurs in any practical algorithm to recognise SL% 2( 1, found using the discrete log oracle. We claim that . Proposition 5.18 in [KS] . This contains an algorithm for finding an SLP to any given element 8
, and uses some of the previous procedures whose timings had factors of $ .
End of proof.
We can now complete the algorithm by direct imitation of [KS], Sections 5 and 7.2.2. 
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